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Es mi homenaje a Melchor Cano, el teólogo dominico que teologizó siempre con autoridad. Siguió en esto y en su estilo humanístico a su venerado Maestro, Francisco de Vitoria. Trato de la época anterior a su profesorado salmantino. Lo mío es el pedestal sobre el que se apoyará su apoteosis, que estará en: la cátedra de Prima de Teología de Salamanca, el concilio de Trento, el asesoramiento como consejero de Felipe II, los Lugares Teológicos. Lo mío es, pues, el (...) lugar que lo vio nacer, la formación salmantina como dominico, la coronación de su formación teológica y primer profesorado en el Colegio de San Gregorio de Valladolid, y su irradiación desde la cátedra principal de teología en la universidad de Alcalá. It is my homage to Melchior Cano, the Dominican theologian who always taught theology with authority. He followed his venerate master Francisco de Vitoria. I am talking of the previous time to his teaching at Salamanca. My intention is to show the pedestal on which his apotheosis will stand: the theological chair of Prima at Salamanca, the Council of Trent, the advice as Philip II’ counselor, the theological places as well as the place where he was born, his education in Salamanca, as a Dominican, the culmination of his theological education, his first teaching at St. Gregory’s college at Valladolid and his irradiation from the main theological chair at Alcala University. (shrink)

In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)

During the first half of the twentieth century, many philosophers of memory opposed the postulation of memory traces based on the claim that a satisfactory account of remembering need not include references to causal processes involved in recollection. However, in 1966, an influential paper by Martin and Deutscher showed that causal claims are indeed necessary for a proper account of remembering. This, however, did not settle the issue, as in 1977 Malcolm argued that even if one were to buy Martin (...) and Deutscher’s argument for causal claims, we still don’t need to postulate the existence of memory traces. This paper reconstructs the dialectic between realists and anti-realists about memory traces, suggesting that ultimately realists’ arguments amount to inferences to the best explanation. I then argue that Malcolm’s anti-realist strategy consists in the suggestion that causal explanations that do not invoke memory traces are at least as good as those that do. But then, Malcolm, I argue that there are a large number of memory phenomena for which explanations that do not postulate the existence of memory traces are definitively worse than explanations that do postulate them. Next, I offer a causal model based on an interventionist framework to illustrate when memory traces can help to explain memory phenomena and proceed to substantiate the model with details coming from extant findings in the neuroscience of memory. (shrink)

The notion of cognitive system is widely used in explanations in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Traditional approaches define cognitive systems in an agent-relative way, that is, via top-down functional decomposition that assumes a cognitive agent as starting point. The extended cognition movement challenged that approach by questioning the primacy of the notion of cognitive agent. In response, [Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2001. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.] suggested that to have a clear understanding of what a cognitive (...) system is we may need to solve “the demarcation challenge”: the problem of identifying a reliable way to determine which mechanisms that are causally responsible for the production of a certain cognitive process constitute a cognitive system responsible for such process and which ones do not. Recently, [Rupert, R. 2009. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] offered a solution based on the idea that the mechanisms that constitute a cognitive system are integrated in a particular sense. In this paper I critically review Rupert’s solution and argue against it. Additionally, I argue that a successful account of cognitive system must accommodate the fact that the neural mechanisms causally responsible for the production of a cognitive process are diachronically dynamic and yet functionally stable. At the end, I offer a suggestion as to how to accommodate this diachronic dynamicity without losing functional stability. I conclude by drawing some implications for the discussion on cognitive ontologies. (shrink)

People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or mental simulations about alternative ways the world could have been. But the perceived plausibility of those counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental simulations, and it explores the role of perceived similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived plausibility of a counterfactual event is (...) predicted by the perceived similarity between the possible world in which the imagined situation is thought to occur and the actual world. Second, when people attend to differences between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as less similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as less plausible. Lastly, when people attend to what is identical between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as more similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as more plausible. We discuss these results in light of philosophical, semantic, and psychological theories of counterfactual thinking. (shrink)

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models (...) of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with (...) his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard. (shrink)

Neste artigo propomos uma reconceitualização do amor como um modo de engajamento intersubjetivo normativamente guiado pela busca constante do equilíbrio entre a sub- e a sobredeterminação de seu objeto, que se efetiva em relações deconfiança marcadas pelo cuidado com o(a) outro(a). Esta reconceitualização permite que o amor participe da epistemologia como uma virtude intelectual responsabilista, que nos torna membros mais confiáveis de nossas comunidades epistêmicas e nos aproxima de descrições verdadeiras sobre o mundo, ao deixar que diversos pontos de vista (...) sobre esses objetos sejam reconhecidos e valorizados. (shrink)

In our everyday interactions we easily and effortlessly perceive emotions in others’ facial expressions and bodily behavior. How do we do that? Philosophers and psychologists have long argued about the fundamentals of emotion perception and the debate is far from settled. While some insist on the sufficiency of the morphological information contained in facial expressions, others construe the objects of emotion perception as more complex, comprising multimodal information such as touch, tone of voice, body postures, and so on. Others, in (...) turn, have gone so far as to deny that there is a pre-given object in emotion perception in the first place, so that processes of emotion perception must be conceptualized as emergent and co-constructed phenomena in contexts of social interaction. The purpose of this paper is to argue that John Dewey’s pragmatist theory of emotions can help us make significant theoretical advancements in the understanding of emotion perception, according to which emotions are coordinated modes of behavior that we enact with others in the contexts of social interactions. In this picture, perceiving emotions is a matter of participating in a joint activity of socio- affective coordination. This theory allows us to apprehend important insights about emotion perception that appear in these contemporary debates, while at the same time avoiding their pitfalls. (shrink)

What is it like to perceive a feared object? According to a popular neo-Gibsonian theory in psychology, fear biases our perceptions of objects so as to encourage particular kinds of actions: when we are afraid, spiders may be perceived as physically closer than they are in order to promote fleeing. Firestone mounted severe criticisms against this view, arguing that these cases are better explained by non-perceptual biases that operate on accurate perceptions of the external environment. In this paper I will (...) argue that fear might indeed distort our perceptions of the world, but not in the way neo-Gibsonians suppose. In the view I favor, perceptual distortions occur as by-products of fearful attention, a special mode of attention that is part of an orchestrated defensive response that prepares the organism to deal effectively with a threat. To argue for this view I will rely on empirical evidence that fearful attention narrows down the focus of attention and favors processing of local rather than global features of stimuli, which may jointly explain why perceptual distortions might occur in fearful object seeing. This view has consequences not only for empirical investigations in fearful perceptual distortions, but also for an explanation of the intentionality of fear and the phenomenal integration of bodily and intentional elements in fear episodes. (shrink)

Con el presente texto se pretende hacer un ejercicio reflexivo en torno a los nuevos retos que debe cumplir la ética personal y social a partir de las normativas de papel, las cuales emergen a raíz de la consolidación de una cultura del incumplimiento de las reglas en nuestro contexto latinoamericano y le hacen mucho daño a los individuos en los diferentes escenarios sociales. Para tal efecto, se inicia haciendo un análisis sobre la corrupción como fenómeno ejemplar que afecta el (...) cumplimiento de las normas. Posteriormente, se aborda el problema referido a la violación de la norma y la disonancia cognitiva, la cual es un conflicto mental que surge cuando existe un desacuerdo entre las actuaciones y las creencias de los individuos, por lo general, éstas tienden a contradecirse. Finalmente, se trae a colación, la situación de que los tres elementos anteriores nos conllevan a repensar la vida desde una ética personal y social. (shrink)

RESUMEN Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría. ABSTRACT Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose (...) symptoms include disorders or impairments of consciousness. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term consciousness is not altogether clear. This article presents a systematic review of various meanings attributed to this term, as well as of diverse associated philosophical problems. Likewise, it reconstructs some philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness, identifying their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, it offers some suggestions for the use of the term consciousness in psychiatry. (shrink)

Este ensayo trata de la confrontación entre principios universalistas y particularistas en lo que respecta a la construcción de identidades colectivas y nacionalidades (con especial referencia al Tercer Mundo). Por un lado tenemos los principios universalistas, basados generalmente en el racionalismo clásico y la Ilustración, cuyo representante más conspicuo en el campo de la filosofía comparativa de la historia fue el Marqués de Condorcet. A esta corriente se le puede achacar una equiparación entre ciencias naturales y sociales, un optimismo histórico (...) acrítico y una clara tendencia niveladora y centralizadora. Por otro lado tenemos los principios particularistas, relativistas y parcialmente tradicionalistas, que sostienen la autonomía de las ciencias sociales y que buscan comprender la verdad inherente a las llamadas culturas arcaicas y extra-europeas, mediante un impulso intuitivo y reconstructivo (que contiene aspectos identificatorios y empáticos). Dos de los representantes moderados de esta tendencia son G.B. Vico y J.G. Herder. Mediante una crítica de ambas corrientes el autor cree posible una síntesis fructífera de ambos principios, considerados como complementarios (sobre todo en sus versiones moderadas): la ética universal (en especial los derechos humanos) sería la base para un derecho efectivo a la diferencia. (shrink)

A través de un recuento de elementos biográficos, el autor despliega no solo una visión de la evolución de su pensamiento filosófico, sino además de la evolución misma de algunas de las ideas más debatidas en el mundo filosófico de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, y las cuales influyeron en la elaboración de su teoría crítica de la modernización, la cual aquí se expone en líneas generales.

Bolivia -como muchas naciones en el Tercer Mundo- está cada vez más inmersa en el universo globalizado contemporáneo, cuyos productos, valores y hasta tonterías va adoptando de modo inexorable. En este contexto no resulta fácil distinguir un paradigma propio y genuino de desarrollo de un modelo exte..

El texto muestra la complejidad de la discusión en torno al sentido y la dirección de la historia, y sobre todo la dificultad mayor de una dotación de sentido a favor del desarrollo histórico en el mundo actual. El artículo reconstruye brevemente la posición pesimista de la Escuela de Frankfurt sobre este tema, posición que representa una respuesta al optimismo convencional del liberalismo y del marxismo, desde una crítica de los resultados debidos a la tecnología y a la vista de (...) los problemas ecológicos. Finalmente se esboza el escepticismo moderado de Karl Löwith como un compromiso aceptable. (shrink)

El artículo presenta aspectos de la confrontación entre el pensamiento religioso y la racionalidad contemporánea, a partir de ideas de pensadores de nuestra época como Horckheimer, Habermas, Savater, y otros, quienes plantean que el presente panorama cultural en el cual la investigación científica y el progreso técnico difunden conocimientos y actitudes secularistas y cientificistas, se aleja de consideraciones éticas esenciales al ser humano. Pero la dimensión religiosa puede aportar criterios éticos para un principio de responsabilidad global frente al mundo y (...) el hombre, ya que esa es y sigue siendo función primaria y aun válida de la religiosidad. (shrink)

La religión ha sido la institución más afectada por la pluralización de la realidad social. Esto es debido a que el papel simbólico y global de la religión, en tanto que institución integradora y significativa, queda socavado desde la plausibilidad de sus definiciones sociales de la realidad. La causa de esta situación se encuentra en que las personas viven -conciencia subjetiva- nuevos roles institucionales, nuevos esquemas interpretativos, nuevos valores y creencias. Sin embargo, si algo permanece invariablemente constante en la vida (...) diaria de las personas es, afirma Berger, el temor a las situaciones marginales y a la anomia. Ni el proceso de secularización con sus universos simbólicos (filosofía diurna y teodiceas seculares), ni el resurgimiento religioso y global (desecularización público-política) han podido dar una explicación plausible y convincente de estos fenómenos que tanto afectan a la conciencia y a las identidades subjetivas de los individuos. En este sentido, y tras el fracaso de las anteriores cosmovisiones en su intento de dotar de sentido a la realidad y la vida ordinaria de las personas, Berger recurre a una nueva instauración del «nomos religioso» Religion has been the institution most affected by the plurarization of social reality. This is because the overall symbolic role of religion as an institution inclusive and meaningful, is undermined from the plausibility of their social definitions of reality. The cause of this situation is that people live-subjetive consciousness-new institutional roles, new interpretative schemes, new values and beliefs. If something always remains constant in the daily lives of the people, says Berger, the fear of marginal situations and anomie. Neither the process of secularization with its symbolic universe (diurnal philosophy and secular theodicies) and the religious revival and global (desecularization public-politic) could give a plausible and convincing explication of these phenomena that affect the subjective consciousness and identity of individuals. In this regard, and after the failure of previous worldviews in their attempt to give meaning to reality and the ordinary life of people, Berger uses a new establishment of «nomos religioso». (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo propone reinterpretar la noción de cuerpo en la filosofia de Nietzsche contrastada con dos perspectivas relevantes de los estudios nietzscheanos en habla hispana: primero, la idea de que el cuerpo es sinónimo de naturaleza; y segundo, la idea de que el cuerpo es causa del sujeto. Pasando la mirada sobre una parte de la obra -publicada e inédita- de Nietzsche posterior al año 1885, se observa que la noción de cuerpo funge el papel de una metodologia que (...) permite llevar a cabalidad una renovada tarea de su filosofia, a saber, la tarea de conocerse a si mismo. Asi, la noción de cuerpo en Nietzsche, más allá de ser un concepto innovador o reivindicado, es una herramienta interpretante que le permite al autor establecer nuevas dimensiones "entre" el conocer y la experimentación corporal. ABSTRACT This paper proposes a re-interpretation of the idea of Body in Nietzsche's philosophy to distinguish it from two important perspectives of Nietzsche-studies in Spanish: The first one maintains that the Body is comparable with Nature, and the second one, states that the Body is a cause of subjectivity. Analyzing part of Nietzsche's work after 1885 -published and unpublished- shows that the idea of the Body works as a methodology that allows Nietzsche to accomplish a new task of his philosophy, such as the task of self-knowledge. In this way, the Body in Nietzsche's philosophy, besides being an innovative and redeemable concept, is a performative tool that establishes new dimensions "in-between" human knowing and bodily experimentation. (shrink)

The goal of mapping psychological functions to brain structures has a venerable history. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, this elusive goal regained vigor and became the main purpose of cognitive neuroscience. Unfortunately, as the field continues to develop, the ideal of finding one-to-one mappings from psychological functions to brain areas looks increasingly unrealistic. In the past few years, however, many cognitive neuroscientists have advocated for mining large sets of neuroimaging data in order to find the elusive one-to-one mapping. One (...) recent strategy, proposed by Genon and colleagues (2018), constitutes one of the most concrete proposals for discovering the mappings from brain regions to cognitive functions by using big-data repositories of neuroimaging results. In this paper we offer several challenges for their proposal and argue that big-data approaches to finding one-to-one mappings between brain regions and cognitive functions suffer from significant difficulties of their own. (shrink)

The ability to develop and use models to explain phenomena is a key component of the Next Generation Science Standards, and without examples of what modeling instruction looks like in the reality of classrooms, it will be difficult for us as a field to understand how to move forward in designing curricula that foreground the practice in ways that align with the epistemic commitments of modeling. In this article, we illustrate examples drawn from a model-based curriculum development project to problematize (...) and bring to the fore issues and tensions we observed through the course of modeling instruction. In doing so, we argue that instruction that is model-based may not be actualizing modeling as an epistemic practice to support student sensemaking. We suggest that this kind of enactment may be a result of the tensions between viewing models as content to be learned and modeling as a scientific practice in which the end products are not known ahead of time. We discuss the implications of our analysis for teacher learning and curriculum development. (shrink)

Cooperative learning (CL) is one of the pedagogical models that has had more application in the area of Physical Education (PE) in recent years, being highly worked in the initial training of teachers. The aim of the study is to check to what extent future PE teachers are able to apply in the classroom the PE training they have received at university, deepening their fears, insecurities and problems when carrying it out. Thirteen future PE teachers (7 girls and 6 boys) (...) aged 20.87±1.43 participated and, after having been trained in CL in various subjects, applied it in the classroom during their internship. A qualitative methodology was used, being the interviews, the teaching diaries and the seminars with the tutor the instruments of data collection used. Three categories of analysis were used: a) initial expectations in the application of the CL; b) problems encountered in its implementation; c) reflection about its application in the future. The results showed how the future teachers did not see their expectations of success fulfilled, encountering resistance from both students and teachers in PE. Furthermore, they reflect the need to continue training in a model that has infinite nuances so that it can be implemented satisfactorily. It is necessary to continue researching a pedagogical model with so many possibilities in the area of PE and with so much transversality on a social level. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis. We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions (...) ought to accommodate: Reciprocal Other-awareness and Integration. Consideration of and discussion of relational accounts of joint attention lead us to the proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals’ experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding. (shrink)

This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors’ own (...) contributions to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things? (shrink)

la historia del escepticismo es oscura. Si bien se reconoce la existencia, misteriosa y discutida, de un escepticismo académico platónico, hay algunas dudas de la realidad inequívoca de una escuela pirrónica radical. En este artículo vamos a discutir, primero, hasta qué punto puede hablarse de escuela, secta o grupo filosófico pirrónico, y, segundo, si, como veremos, hay dudas del reconocimiento de este homogéneo grupo ¿por qué se habla de ella de ‘escuela’, ‘secta’ o ‘sistema’ pirrónico?

El narcotráfico no es una realidad nueva en España, pero sí carecía de producciones culturales tales como novelas, series de televisión, películas y piezas musicales tan comunes como populares en América Latina. En la última década la narcocultura comenzó a cimentar en España, con especial énfasis en Galicia. En efecto, al menos a nivel simbólico Galicia ocupa el sitio protagónico como epicentro del narcotráfico. ¿Cómo es representado el narcotráfico en Galicia? ¿Existen diferencias sustanciales entre las narcoficciones gallegas y las latinoamericanas? (...) Este trabajo responde a estas preguntas desde la formulación de tres tesis relacionas con la violencia y el consumo. (shrink)

This article engages critically with Margaret Gilbert’s proposal that joint commitments are necessary for collective emotions. After introducing Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment (Section 2), and the joint commitment account of collective emotions (Section 3), we argue in Section 4 that research from developmental psychology challenges the necessity of joint commitments for collective emotions. In that section, we also raise a more principled objection to Gilbert’s account, independently of developmental considerations. Section 5 develops a complementary line of argument, focused on (...) the notion of mutual recognition. While we agree with Gilbert that mutual recognition has an important role to play in an account of collective emotions, we take issue with her attempt to analyse face-to-face based mutual recognition in terms of the concept of joint commitment. We conclude by sketching an alternative analysis of collective emotions that highlights the role of interpersonal identification and socially mediated self-consciousness. (shrink)

Croce is a heir of the best posrenacentist traditions. Maquiavelo and Galileo are presents in the rigor of his thought and the intention to apprehend the concreteness and the verifiableness. But also they are Hegel, and before Vico, in its unfolded universalist glance on the historical process. ..

"œLa phronesis como forma mentis de eticidad"Este ensayo pretende restaurar el espacio en que el pensamiento griego situ� los conceptos de virtud y de prudencia, invocando una nueva interpretaci�n sobre el problema de la �tica y la subjetividad. El autor diserta sobre la virtud de la prudencia con el uso de una hermen�utica com�n a la tradici�n cultural del Occidente europeo y que integra lo mejor de la interpretaci�n hist�rica que Croce, Heidegger o Bultmann, por ejemplo, han legado al debate (...) filos�fico. Todo esto sin perder de vista que esas interpretaciones tambi�n son la expresi�n de una subjetividad humana con un contexto hist�rico preciso, siempre contingente y nunca perfectamente asible. "œPhronesis as a forma mentis of ethicity"This essay tries to restore the space in which Greek thought placed the concepts of virtue and prudence, calling on a new interpretation of the problem of Ethics and subjectivity. The author disserts about prudence as a virtue and the use, in the European culturan tradition, of Hermeneutics, which compose the best of historical interpretation that Croce, Heidegger or Bultmann, for example, have inherited to the philosophical discussion. This debate also considers that these interpretations are the expression of a human subjectivity with a definite historical context, always contingent and never perfectly seizable. (shrink)

This article describes and analyzes the book by L. Novakovic, Resurrection, which studies the complex topic of the resurrection of Jesus and its consequences, including, primarily, the faith of Christians in their own resurrection. The Author presents the contents of the book, and indicates the merits and limits of the research and the value of its conclusions.

A major study of Futurist movement of Marinetti in the Rio de la Plata region (Argentina, Uruguay and the qualities that unite two cultures, in this case, beween Italian Futurism, and the vanguard of the Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo). With a wide variety of reproductions of photographs, paintings, magazine covers and books and documents in general, the author shows what was meant in this movement and what were their influences and impacts on the Rio de la (...) Plata. (shrink)